ABSTRACT In this paper, we focus on the differential cryptanalysis dedicated to a particular class of cryptographic algorithms, namely ARX ciphers. We propose a new algorithm inspired by the Nested Monte-Carlo Search algorithm to find a differential path in ARX ciphers. We apply our algorithm to a round reduced variant of the block cipher LEA. For small blocks of ARX ciphers, our algorithm works perfectly and in an extremely concise time. Taking into account that our algorithm takes longer for bigger blocks, we use the concept of a partial difference distribution table (pDDT) in our algorithm. This methodology reduced the search space of the algorithm by using only those differentials whose probabilities are greater than or equal to a pre-defined threshold. Using this concept, we removed many differentials which are not valid or whose probabilities are very low. This led to a decreased time of finding a differential path by our nested algorithm due to a smaller search space. This partial difference distribution table also made our nested algorithm suitable for bigger block size ARX ciphers. In previous works, finding long differential characteristics has been shown to be a problem of a harder nature where algorithms have been shown to take many hours or days to find differential characteristics in ARX ciphers. In this paper, our algorithm finds the differential characteristics in just a few minutes with a very simple framework. We report the differential path for up to nine rounds in LEA. To construct differential characteristics for a large number of rounds, we use techniques to divide long characteristics into short ones, by constructing a large characteristic from two short characteristics. Furthermore, instead of starting from the first round as most algorithms do, we start from the middle and run experiments in the forward as well as in the reverse direction. Using this method, we improved our results and report the differential path for up to 12 rounds and with the given path we attacked 14 rounds of cipher. Overall, it is clear to see that the best property of our algorithm is that it has the potential to provide state-of-the-art results but within a simpler framework as well as in less time than previous attempts. Our algorithm provides a reusable framework for future avenues of research, as it could be applied to other ARX ciphers with the potential for interesting and efficient results.s INDEX TERMS ARX ciphers, block cipher, differential characteristics, LEA cipher, nested Monte-Carlo search.
I. INTRODUCTION
ARX, which stands for Addition/Rotation/XOR, is a class of symmetric-key algorithms designed using only the following simple operations:
1) modular addition 2) bitwise rotation 3) exclusive-OR (XOR) In academia and industry alike, ARX has gained an enormous amount of interest because of its small size and simple operations. By using combined linear and non-linear operations by XOR, bit shift, bit rotation and modular addition (iterating them for many rounds), ARX has become very resistant against both linear and differential cryptanalysis. ARX has no look-up table like S-box based algorithms, and therefore these ciphers are very secure against well known side channel attacks.
On the one hand, the cryptanalysis of typical S-box based algorithms is easy because it consists of four or eight-bit words. On the other hand, the linear or differential cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers is much more difficult. By calculating the linear approximation table (LAT) or differential distribution table (DDT) it is easy to evaluate linear and differential properties of the S-box. However, to calculate such tables for ARX even for a 32-bit word is not computationally feasible. We have seen advancements to bring feasibility to this problem using partial difference distribution table (pDDT), which have just a few fractions of all the differentials possible in the table. This table contains only such differentials which have a probability greater than some predetermined fixed threshold. This becomes possible since the probabilities of XOR (respectively ADD) differentials through the modular addition (respectively XOR) operation are monotonously decreasing with the bit size of the word.
In our analysis, we focus on the LEA cipher which was first introduced in [1] . LEA has 128-bit block size and 128, 192, or 256-bit keysize. It provides encryption on general purpose processors with high speed software. It has been shown that LEA is faster than AES on Advanced RISC Machines (ARM), Advanced Mirco Devices (AMD), Coliforms and INTEL platforms. LEA consists of only three ARX operations (modular Addition, bitwise Rotation, and bitwise XOR) which operate on 32-bit words. Those operations are fast and very well supported in many 32-bit or 64-bit platforms.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm based on the nested method to find good differential characteristics in ARX ciphers. We face a huge state space problem in finding a good differential path, where there is no obvious way to proceed to the next step. These kinds of problems are presented in many different fields, but we are inspired by single-player games such as Morpion solitaire, SameGame and Sudoku. We are inspired by the heuristics of the Nested Monte-Carlo Search which works very well for these games and are shown in [2] . We also create a nested algorithm based on the technical complexity of our problem.
In our previous work [3] , we applied a naive algorithm and succeeded to find differential characteristics only for smaller state size in SPECK. For other variants, because of the bigger state size and due to large state space, the algorithm given was not able to produce results even after letting the algorithm run for a long period of time. Constructing a complete Difference Distribution Table (DDT) for n-bit words, the modular addition itself would require 2 3n × 4 bytes of memory which is far from feasible to create such a large table. Therefore, we also used the concept of a partial difference distribution table (pDDT) [4] in our earlier work using differentials which are valid and have a probability greater than some specified threshold.
We drew further inspriation by the highways and country roads analogy proposed by Biryukov et al. [4] [5] in two related papers. The problem of finding a differential path in a cipher was shown and described as finding fast routes between two cities. Differentials that have high probability can be treated the same as highways, and low probability differentials can be treated the same as slow country roads. In the same paper, the authors also introduced the concept of a partial difference distribution table (pDDT). Therefore in our algorithm, we try to find those differentials which have high probability like highways, and if such differentials do not exist, we XOR the two inputs, and with the output value, we calculate the probability. Using an approach of this nature we find no need to take completely random decisions for our advanced nested algorithm. This in turn improves the decision process of the algorithm.
II. RELATED CRYPTANALYSIS
With similarity to ARX ciphers, there have been many works over the years. Some examples of ARX ciphers are:
• block cipher SPECK [6] • block cipher LEA [1] • block cipher Chaskey [7] • stream cipher Salsa20 [8] • SHA-3 finalist Skein [9] • SHA-3 finalist Blake [10] Differential cryptanalysis was introduced first by Biham and Shamir in their pivotal work in [11] . For block ciphers, differential cryptanalysis is used to analyze how input differences lead to output differences. If, for example, specific input/output differences happen in a non-random way, it can be used to build a distinguisher or even help recover keys.
To consider the security of iterated block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis, Lai et al. [12] were the pioneers in using the theory of Markov ciphers and made a distinction between a differential and a differential characteristic. A differential is a difference in propagation from an input difference to an output difference. On the other hand, a differential characteristic specifies not only the input/output difference but also all the internal differences after each round. For a Markov cipher, the probability of a differential characteristic is the multiplication of different transition probabilities of each round. On the other hand, the probability of a differential is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all differential characteristics which correspond to the differential.
Directly related to our work here, Song et al. [13] presented a paper where they developed Mouha et al.'s framework from [7] for finding differential characteristics. The new framework functioned by adding a new method to construct long characteristics from short ones. They reported the probabilities of the best differential trails of LEA for up to 13 rounds with total weight −132 and probability 2 −123.79 .
Hong et al. [1] , the designers of LEA did differential cryptanalysis of LEA cipher and reported the differential path up to 11 rounds with the probability 2 −98 . They also did differential-linear, impossible differential and linear cryptanalysis and presented paths for 14, 10 and 11 rounds.
We summarize how the work in this paper compares to other related work in both rounds and characteristic probability in Table 1 . 
III. DESCRIPTION OF LEA
Introduced in [1] , LEA provides high-speed encryption with software and general purpose processors. It has a block size of 128 bit with key sizes of 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit.
LEA ( Figure 1 ) plaintexts are divided into four 32 bit words
) and after encryption they produce ciphertexts
, where r represents rounds and the value of r is 24 for LEA-128, 28 for LEA-192, and 32 for LEA-256. The Round function for round i, 0 ≤ i < r is defined by:
where
is the round key generated by the key schedule.
A. KEY SCHEDULE OF LEA-128
where δ i is the constant for round i. The constants for generating round keys are defined as: 
B. KEY SCHEDULE OF LEA-192
, rk i is produced through following relations:
where δ i is the constant for round i.
C. KEY SCHEDULE OF LEA-256
Let
be a 256-bit key. We set
IV. CALCULATING DIFFERENTIAL PROBABILITIES
In [14] , Lipmaa and Moriai studied the differential properties of addition. Let xdp + (a, b → c) be the XOR-differential probability of addition modulo 2 n , with input differences a and b and output difference c. Lipmaa and Moriai proved that the differential (a, b → c) is valid if and only if:
For every valid differential (a, b → c), we define the weight w(a, b → c) of the differential as follows:
The weight of a valid differential can then be calculated as:
where h * (x) denotes the number of non-zero bits in x, not counting
A differential characteristic defines not only the input and output differences but also the internal differences after every round of the iterated cipher.
In our analysis, we follow a common assumption that the probability of a valid differential characteristic is equal to the multiplication of the probabilities of each addition operation. The XOR operation and bit rotation are linear in GF(2), therefore for these two operations for every input difference there is only one valid output difference.
V. PARTIAL DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION TABLES (pDDT)
A partial difference distribution table (pDDT) proposed by Biryukov et al. [4] is a table that contains all XOR differentials (a, b → c) whose differential probabilities (DP) are greater than or equal to a pre-defined threshold p thres .
To compute pDDT efficiently, we will use the following proposition: The differential probability (DP) of XOR of addition modulo 2 n is monotonously decreasing with the word size of differences a, b, c.
if n==k then 5: Add (a, b, c) ←− (a k , b k , c k ) 
if p k+1 ≥ p thres then 12: computepddt(n, p thres , k + 1, p k+1 , a k+1 , 13: b k+1 , c k+1 ) 14: end if 15: end for 16: return 17: end function where
and x k denotes the k LSB's of the difference x that is
In our algorithm, we start from least-significant ( In our nested algorithm, we set the threshold value equal to 0.1 and therefore the size of our algorithms search space is equal to 3951388 from Table 2 . If we decrease the value of the threshold, the size of search space will increase depending on the threshold value and the differential path computational speed of our algorithm will decrease in equal proportion. 
VI. NESTED MONTE CARLO SEARCH
The Monte Carlo method -the heuristic based on random sampling -dates back to the 1940s. In 2008, Remi Coulom proposed what is now known as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), that is the application of the Monte Carlo method to game-tree search. The algorithm is particularly useful for games where it is hard to formulate an evaluation function, such as the game of Go. A very recent success of AlphaGo is partly due to the efficient MCTS algorithm (combined with a deep neural network) [15] . For single-player games, a variant called the Nested Monte-Carlo Search has been proposed [2] .
Let's take a tree-like structure to understand the Nested Monte-Carlo Search algorithm. At each step the NMCS algorithm tries all possible moves and memorises the move associated to the best score of the lower level searches, that is, a nested of level 1 makes a playout for every possible move and choose to play the move of the best playout. A nested of level 2 does the same thing except that is replaces the playout by a nested of level one.
During the first iteration the initial state (root) is selected, and for the selected state all legal actions are determined (Figure 3 ). Therefore at level 0 it play the random game for all possible moves valid for selected state (root). Then it moves one step ahead to next level with the greatest associated score.
Searching for a differential path with high probability is also a type of problem where we face huge state space. Typically, there is not a clear and obvious way to proceed in such kind of problems, and we hoped NMCS would be helpful for our problem. However, the NMCS algorithm tries all possible moves at each level, but in our problem of finding differential path, it is not possible due to the large size of blocks.
Therefore we applied our algorithm inspired by NMCS algorithm to eliminate this problem for our cipher and presented a new algorithm based on NMCS with an example in the next paragraph. Instead of trying all possible moves, we try only one random move.
Let us explain this algorithm with a simple example. Our task is to find (possibly) shortest way from one city to another. We represent all possible paths as a tree, where a root is our starting point and leaves are ending points reached by different paths. Each edge between intermediate nodes is associated with a number, which is simply a distance between two nodes. Two lists CurrentPath and BestPath represent the random path currently under investigation and the best available path from previous searches, respectively. The last element in both lists shows a total distance traveled. Initially, both the lists are empty as shown in Figure 4 Nested Monte-Carlo Search uses random playouts. Let us take random moves from the base node to the leaf node and save the path in the Current Path list. Our random path is {a, b, d, i} which has a distance score 18. Since there has not been a better path (BestPath is empty), then we save the current path and its distance as BestPath, as shown in Figure 5 . Next, we go one level down in BestPath and start a random walk from the new node. In our example, starting from the VOLUME 6, 2018 Then, we again go one step down in BestPath and repeat the process. This time we play a random move from e and find that new path is {e, j}. (See Figure 7 .) The score for CurrentPath is 15, which is not better than the previous best path score. Thus we do not update BestPath.
Once we reach the leaf node, we repeat the whole process from the base node. This time Bestpath would not be empty, as there would be some result from the previous search.
In this kind of problems like in our example, we often face the exploration versus exploitation dilemma when searching for a new path. In Nested Monte Carlo Search by letting investigate a completely new path (starting randomly from the base node), the algorithm 'cares' about exploration. On the other hand, by investigating BestPath on the subsequent levels of the tree, we exploit BestPath and hope to improve it.
VII. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR ALGORITHM BASED ON NMCS
We will define two functions, RandomPath(node_position) and Nested(node_position) to describe our algorithm. These two functions are the main building blocks of the algorithm. The first function RandomPath(node_position) walks a random path in the search tree from a given node, and it walks until it reaches the leaf node (See Algorithm 2). A list of nodes (from the base node to the leaf) and the cost corresponding to the path are returned by function RandomPath. while node_position = leaf do 3: go randomly to the next node 4: end while 5: return path, cost 6: end function
The second function is Nested(node_position) which is a recursive function. Nested(node_position) calls itself on every level of the tree search until it reaches the leaf node. Algorithm 3 represents the pseudo-code of the function. We use two global variables in the given pseudo-code which are responsible for keeping a list of nodes in the best path, namely (best_path) and the cost (best_cost) corresponding to the given best path. Initially, best_cost is initialized with a large value and best_path is empty. We assume here that a lower cost means a better solution. Nested (node_position) 4: i = i + 1 5: end while itself is variable. It could be for example a number of iterations, a given time limit or even the maximum cost of the best path. The Nested Search could also be efficiently run in parallel, either with completely independent instances or with a small overhead to communicate best solutions between instances.
VIII. FINDING DIFFERENTIAL PATHS
Finding differential characteristics in algorithms could be treated as a single player game. We start with input difference, and after each round of cipher a decision is mandatory. Here, the decision means selection of input-output transition through the non-linear part of the round. In ARX cipher, modular addition is the source of non-linearity and therefore transition through this modular addition represents the decision part in the algorithm. Generally, for an input difference, there might be many valid output differences. We explained this in Section IV. Each transition through the modular addition is probabilistic. Transition with a very low probability has a very high cost and vice-versa. By multiplying the probabilities associated with all transitions through modular addition, we calculate the total cost of the path. To increase the speed of our nested algorithm and to produce better results for larger block size, we reduced the search space by using partial difference distribution table called pDDT. We note here that creating a complete difference distribution table is infeasible because of large block size in ARX ciphers. This table only contains valid and high differential transitions. Therefore, our nested algorithm does not waste time taking random values for the transitions which are not valid. For a 32 -bit block instead of taking transition values from the 2 32 items (many transitions are not valid) it will only take those transitions (from pDDT table) which are valid and has some probability greater than a pre-defined threshold probability. We aim to find the differential path for a given number of rounds with the highest probability.
IX. OBTAINING LONG CHARACTERISTIC
It is a well-known fact that it is easier to find a short characteristic (for a small number of rounds) instead of a long characteristic. Therefore, we use the start-in-the-middle approach to find a long characteristic from two short ones. In this method, we start our algorithm from the middle of the rounds in two directions, forward toward the end and at the same time backwards towards the beginning.
In this experiment, we apply internal difference inputs from the middle of the given number of rounds. For example, if we want to find a path for 14 rounds, then we pass inputs to our algorithm and let it run for 7 rounds forwards and 7 rounds backwards (reverse). Once we acquire the result for both directions, we combine them to get a long characteristic for the 14 rounds (see Figure 8 ). This method also saves time by not needing to search long characteristics and in the end provides us with a better result.
X. DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LEA
In this paper, we used our algorithm with the partial difference distribution table (pDDT) for finding the best differential trails in the ARX cipher LEA. We showed the practical application of the new method on round-reduced variants of the block cipher LEA. For the 128-bit state of the cipher, we run the experiments for long characteristics starting from the first round. We report the differential path for up to 9 rounds. In Table 3 , each block represents a 32-bit state size. Differences are encoded as hexadecimal numbers, and probability for a given weight is given by 2 weight . We use a threshold value for pDDT table equal to 0.1, and our search space contains 3951388 values with probability greater than or equal to 0.1. For any larger threshold value, the pDDT size is small, and the speed of the experiment is fast because the algorithm takes values from a smaller search space. However, increasing the threshold value may lead to missing values which are not in the table may be necessary to make a good differential path. Conversely setting the threshold value for the pDDT table as too small may lead to the experiment speed being slow because of bigger search space. So there is a balance here to make sure and set the threshold properly to include the values which are necessary to make the good differential path.
In the second part of our experiment, we also perform the experiment starting from the middle of the rounds and run our tool in both directions. Using this method, we improved our results and reported the differential path for up to 12 rounds in Table 4 .
XI. DIFFERENTIAL ATTACKS
Dinur proposed an enumeration technique [16] for key recovery in differential attacks against SPECK. The differential equations of addition in the key recovery of LEA are same as for SPECK, therefore we can apply the same technique to recover the key in LEA cipher as well. Consider that we have given a r-round characteristics of LEA which has probability p > 2 · 2 −N , where N represents the block size of cipher. For LEA-128 and LEA-192, the attack can recover the key of a variant of (r + 1) rounds. The number of plaintexts required to attack will be 2 · p −1 , with time complexity equal to 2 · p −1 encryptions. For LEA-256, the attack can recover the key of (r + 2) rounds with 2 · p −1 plaintexts and 2 · p −1 · 2 N encryptions. For the table of attack and complexity, please refer to Appendix.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we applied our algorithm to find differential characteristics for ARX block ciphers. We were able to find a differential path of length 9 rounds with probability 2 −98 for a LEA cipher. Moreover, we also used a method for constructing long characteristics from short ones in our algorithm. This modification enhanced our results reporting a path length of 12 rounds with probability 2 −126 (Refer to Appendix). We used a partial difference distribution table (pDDT) to reduce the size of the search space in our algorithm. We can produce faster results compared to any other methods of finding a differential path. We have been successfully able to get results in just a few minutes using our algorithm in scenarios which what would have previously taken many hours.
APPENDIX
See Tables 5 and 6 . 
